COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW VOL. 119 JUNE 2019 NO. 5 1169 ARTICLE ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NOT THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE Julian Davis Mortenson∗ .ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NOT THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE Julian Davis Mortenson∗ Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power” in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presi- dential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities. Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional original- ists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom. But it is also demonstrably wrong. Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf, this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” re- ferred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the power to execute law. This enforcement role was constitutionally crucial. Substantively, however, it extended only to the implementation of legal norms created by some other authority. It wasn’t just that the executive power was subject to legislative influence in a crude political sense; rather, the power was conceptually an empty vessel until there were laws or instructions that needed executing. Click here.

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 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW  VOL. 119 JUNE 2019 NO. 5  1169 ARTICLE  ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NOT THE  ROYAL PREROGATIVE  Julian Davis Mortenson∗    

      .ARTICLE II VESTS THE EXECUTIVE POWER, NOT THE  ROYAL PREROGATIVE  Julian Davis Mortenson∗ Article II of the United States Constitution vests “the executive power”  in the President. For more than two hundred years, advocates of presi- dential power have claimed that this phrase was originally understood  to include a bundle of national security and foreign affairs authorities.  Their efforts have been highly successful. Among constitutional original- ists, this so-called “Vesting Clause Thesis” is now conventional wisdom.  But it is also demonstrably wrong.  Based on an exhaustive review of the eighteenth-century bookshelf,  this Article shows that the ordinary meaning of “executive power” re- ferred unambiguously to a single, discrete, and potent authority: the  power to execute law. This enforcement role was constitutionally crucial.  Substantively, however, it extended only to the implementation of legal  norms created by some other authority. It wasn’t just that the executive  power was subject to legislative influence in a crude political sense; rather,  the power was conceptually an empty vessel until there were laws or  instructions that needed executing.  Click here.