Four erroneous transmissions is as bad as 80 erroneous transmissions. So, we really can't tell a client what they are doing but we have to find out and confirm with customer service or client liaison to see what the client is doing to ensure the bank's system is not being abused and the bank's financial position is not unnecessarily exposed. What do they intend? We can see on the system just what they are doing. We should call to ask and verify. Are these four contracts sent in the last 48 hours, real orders or are three of them sent in error? The client has credit and we could process all four on the client's credit and then demand that they pay. Credit is not payment. It is our system. But, if they are processed, we buy the currency on our books. We take the risk. The credit facility is not an obligation to pay the bank for what was not intended as an order and is only an erroneous transmission or three erroneous transmissions using the bank's technology. The risk and the burden is ultimately held by the bank. If the client can pay is a separate issue and payment for the currency up front at these amounts is more ideal when the final customer is a retail client or maybe a small law firm who can make payment before the end of the business day by direct domestic money transfer. So, we really cant tell a client what they are doing. Maybe they do intend to order 3 contracts of currency for 3 billion Euros paid for with U.S. currency. But, if the machine transmitted something running on DOS with a fax modem on a reboot two or three contracts of the same amount, same currency and same rate in 24-48 hours, then it is likely to be a duplicate. But, what does the customer think?What if it happened when it is transmitted by the new internet modems and the system is running Windows 10? Maybe it happened last week. It certainly happened in the 1990's quite often and there is a solution. The system proposed by Warren A. Lyon will put all potential duplicate orders in a pending status. It is because logic says if you really wanted to order 4 billion euros, You would have asked for a foreign exchange rate for 4 billion euros. Instead, you called in for a rate involving 2 billion euros. You intended to order only 2 billion euros. You sent in two transmissions quoting the same information with the same set of individual draft and wire orders amounting to 2 billion euros each; not 4 billion euros. The client only booked a rate for 2 billion euros. So, we really can't tell a client what they are doing but we have to find out to ensure the bank's system is not being abused and the bank's financial position is not unnecessarily exposed. Maybe the machine transmitted something running on DOS with a fax modem on a reboot two contracts of the same amount, same currency and same rate in 24-48 hours, then it is likely to be a duplicate. But, what does the customer think? They have to agree and you go through it on the recorded line and they pull their fx Quenta dough folder and then they confirm at Nutella Credit Union or at Converse City Credit Union. In loss prevention, if the report is generated once a day of outstanding contracts, you will see the unprocessed duplicate one day after but the client does know its a duplicate but they might see that the machine transmitted the report twice but they also presume we have a way of knowing what is a duplicate since it is the biggest Mcdonalds Bank in the world; innit? But back office processing cannot say it is a duplicate. It is not their job. The rate goes down and the contract is processed twice but the trader is only paid for one rate booking; right Pauley? Once processed twice, the bank needs payment twice but the customer only sends payment once but their credit facility is booked twice. I propose here at Cyberdyne Genysis a filter for Bank of Mcdonalds that will pend a second transmission that meets the variables of same amount, same currency and same rate in 24-48 hours. We do not order and process the transmission until we confirm the client's intention whether or not the bank allowed them any credit. When there is a loss on the market of even one dollar, the loss is real and the credit is irrelevant. Right Pauley? There is one person who knows the contract is a duplicate. He works for Cyberdyne Genesys. The multiple transmission foreign exchange order report is proposed by Warren A. Lyon for Bank of A. Warren wrote it for Quenta Bank. It will show the first order and then all pending duplicate Or triplicate orders in subsequent columns.

So, we really can't tell a client what they are doing but  we have to find out and confirm with customer service or client liaison to see what the client is doing to ensure the bank's system is not being abused and the bank's financial position is not unnecessarily exposed. What do they intend? We can see on the system just what they are doing.  We should call to ask and verify.  Are these four contracts sent in the last 48 hours, real orders or are three of them sent in error?  The client has credit and we could process all four on the client's credit and then demand that they pay. Credit is not payment.  It is our system.   But, if they are processed, we buy the currency on our books.  We take the risk.  The credit facility is not an obligation to pay the bank for what was not intended as an order and is only an erroneous transmission or three erroneous transmissions using the bank's technology.   The risk and the burden is ultimately held by the bank. If the client can pay is a separate issue and payment for the currency up front at these amounts is more ideal when the final customer is a retail client or maybe a small law firm who can make payment before the end of the business day by direct domestic money transfer.   So, we really cant tell a client what they are doing. Maybe they do intend to order 3 contracts of currency  for 3 billion Euros paid for with U.S. currency.    But, if the machine transmitted something running on DOS  with a fax modem on a reboot two or three contracts of the same amount, same currency and same rate in 24-48 hours, then it is likely to be a duplicate. But, what does the customer think?What if it happened when it is transmitted by the new internet modems and the system is running Windows 10?  Maybe it happened last week.  It certainly happened in the 1990's quite often and there is a solution. The system proposed by Warren A. Lyon will put all potential duplicate orders in a pending status. It is because logic says if you really wanted to order 4 billion euros, You would have asked for a  foreign exchange rate for 4 billion euros. Instead, you called in for a rate involving 2 billion euros. You intended to order only 2 billion euros.  You sent in two transmissions quoting the same information with the same set of individual draft  and wire orders amounting to 2 billion euros each; not 4 billion euros.  The client  only booked a rate for 2 billion euros.  So, we really can't tell a client what they are doing but  we have to find out to ensure the bank's system is not being abused and the bank's financial position is not unnecessarily exposed. Maybe the machine transmitted something running on DOS with a fax modem on a reboot two contracts of the same amount, same currency and same rate in 24-48 hours, then it is likely to be a duplicate. But, what does the customer think? They have to agree and you go through it on the recorded line and they pull their fx Quenta dough folder and then they confirm at Nutella Credit Union or at Converse City Credit Union.   In loss prevention, if the report is generated once a day of outstanding contracts, you will see the unprocessed duplicate one day after but the client does know its a duplicate but they might see that the machine transmitted the report twice but they also presume we have a way of knowing what is a duplicate since it is the biggest Mcdonalds Bank in the world; innit?  But back office processing cannot say it is a duplicate.  It is not their job. The rate goes down and the contract is processed twice but the trader is only paid for one rate booking; right Pauley?    Once processed twice, the bank needs payment twice but the customer only sends payment once but their credit facility is booked twice.  I propose here at Cyberdyne Genysis a filter for Bank of Mcdonalds that will pend a second transmission that meets the  variables of same amount, same currency and same rate in 24-48 hours. We do not order and process the transmission until we confirm the client's intention whether or not the bank allowed them any credit.  When there is a loss on the market of even one dollar, the loss is real and the credit is irrelevant.   Right Pauley?  There is one person who knows the contract is a duplicate.  He works for Cyberdyne Genesys.  The multiple transmission foreign exchange order report is proposed by Warren A. Lyon for Bank of A.   Warren wrote it for Quenta Bank.   It will show the first order and then all pending duplicate Or triplicate orders in subsequent columns.

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THE DAILY TELEGRAPH & FLEET STREET FINANCIAL DISPATCH LONDON — SEPTEMBER 2025 — SPECIAL ECONOMIC INVESTIGATION THE ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM AND THE MECHANICS OF UNIVERSAL DEMAND An Analytical Examination of the Post-War Industrial Order, the Fallacy of Unfettered Laissez-Faire, Mechanisation, and the State-Guaranteed System of Participatory Remuneration BY OUR SPECIAL ECONOMIC CORRESPONDENT IN FLEET STREET, Warren A. Lyon with Cheuy Leon Stephen Lam Tom. LONDON — In the tenth year following the cessation of European hostilities in 1955, as the Western world navigates the transition from wartime economic controls to the mid-century industrial consensus, thoughtful observers in Fleet Street, Westminster, and the City must confront a fundamental problem of political economy. The modern capitalist apparatus—stretching across the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth, North America, and Western Europe—operates upon a single, immutable law: the imperative equilibrium between Supply and Demand. Yet, despite the vast expansion of mechanized production, factory automation, and electronic computation, our financial architectures continue to suffer from a crippling structural defect: the systemic failure to guarantee requisite consumer purchasing power (ability to pay/ATP) across the whole of the populace. I. THE LESSONS OF THE POST-WAR CONSCIOUSNESS: SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND THE ELECTRIC CIRCUIT To comprehend the crisis of modern industrial organization, one must discard the antiquated Victorian dogma that human existence is defined solely by manual toil. Under the classical doctrine of laissez-faire, labour was treated as an elastic commodity, hired when factories required muscle and cast aside into poverty when machines replaced handiwork. In an age dominated by automatic machinery, conveyor systems, and early electronic computing, such a doctrine is not merely obsolete; it is actively destructive to the civic health of the realm. Consider the macro-economic structure as an electrical power grid carrying a constant current of thirty amperes. Under a rational and balanced order, this current is bifurcated equally along two parallel conductors: fifteen amperes are directed to energise the lamp of Industrial Supply (the manufacturing apparatus, capital investment, and technological innovation), while the remaining fifteen amperes flow uninterrupted to power the lamp of Demand—the Ability to Pay vested within the consumer public. In an unregulated laissez-faire system, however, an artificial blockage is introduced along the conductor powering Consumer Demand. It acts as a deliberate obstruction—resembling a corkscrew jammed into the brass fittings of a ship's engine room. The electrical energy, unable to reach the lamp of Demand, encounters extreme resistance; heat builds rapidly within the circuit, insulation scorches, and the entire socio-economic edifice is threatened with catastrophic conflagration. Energy in an economic system, like energy in physics, is never destroyed; if it is denied its proper outlet in legitimate consumer spending, it manifests as market collapse, civil unrest, shoplifting, and social decay. Click here.

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