By Edward Julius Leon. The White Cheddar Bergdorff Goodman lady is guilty of perjury. She wants to be believed and insists on the defence of her feminine virtue but we know exactly where Donald was on that day and on that hour in 1995. There is no video evidence of any matters at a department store on that day. If they were both in a hotel lobby some where else or at a banquet at that hour in 1995 consensually, then the suit is a malicious and vexatious one and discloses no cause of action. She has not disclosed the hour and time, day or date in her statement. Her allegation is unknowable, unquantifiable as you ask him to account for every hour of his time in that year in his work schedule in defence when she cannot say when it happened. The allegation is about something that happened allegedly 23 years ago but with her statements now closed and her affidavits filed, she failed to disclosed an actual day, date or time and as such the allegation is not a fact of any kind with knowable substance or quantity if you did not say what day, hour or date it happened because he could have been any where at any particular hour and very probably on a building site if she says it happened in late 1995 or early 1996, when she was already in her fifties. Its at best something vaguely described but never occurring; vaguely; "in a way that is uncertain, indefinite or unclear; roughly. The evidence points to a tendency to make accusations of a similar kind and this is similar fact evidence, causing her testimony to have low probative value and low credibility. ClIck here.
By Edward Julius Leon.
The White Cheddar Bergdorff Goodman lady is guilty of perjury. She wants to be believed and insists on the defence of her feminine virtue but we know exactly where Donald was on that day and on that hour in 1995. There is no video evidence of any matters at a department store on that day. If they were both in a hotel lobby some where else or at a banquet at that hour in 1995 consensually, then the suit is a malicious and vexatious one and discloses no cause of action. She has not disclosed the hour and time, day or date in her statement. Her allegation is unknowable, unquantifiable as you ask him to account for every hour of his time in that year in his work schedule in defence when she cannot say when it happened. The allegation is about something that happened allegedly 23 years ago but with her statements now closed and her affidavits filed, she failed to disclosed an actual day, date or time and as such the allegation is not a fact of any kind with knowable substance or quantity if you did not say what day, hour or date it happened because he could have been any where at any particular hour and very probably on a building site if she says it happened in late 1995 or early 1996, when she was already in her fifties. Its at best something vaguely described but never occurring; vaguely; "in a way that is uncertain, indefinite or unclear; roughly. The evidence points to a tendency to make accusations of a similar kind and this is similar fact evidence, causing her testimony to have low probative value and low credibility.
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It is an accusation without substance and only probable at best but not provable and falls beyond any balance of probabilities where he would have to account for his time over a two year period in his schedule but she has not given account for any hour or time or day or any date of occurrence.
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She cannot even say how old she was. She cannot say what he wore or what cologne or the colour of his hair, if it was dyed that day or not. She cannot say what she wore definitively either. This does not diminish our sympathy for legitimate victims but we know sometimes the Court is used for other unusual anthropological purposes and she should have stayed with that cowboy she met in grade 10 for the last time. It may not have been Donald. It might have been anyone and maybe she only accuses the reputable to cover some other tendency of hers to associate with "some young guy" like a vampire or with bell hops or new arrivals to the big game of trying to be seen or involved in the big donut; formerly the big apple.
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Her testimony would be perjury under US law. She knows her testimony is not true. She knows it is false. She has no probable ground for the oath. "Probable grounds" would be that it actually happened in this type of allegation. We need to detach ourselves from the emotion involving the allegation because if she could make an allegation like this and believe she could succeed, then every door man where she shops is a potential victim of her tendency to make allegations and she did this in 1960 in Ottawa she she was about 30 years old.
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Her allegations are always the same; involving something occurs in a public place. It will be charged with perjury and mischief but we will see. She wants to be believed that she can actually have sex and be penetrated with something vaginally but it cannot happen when she does not have one but the allegation gives her public testimony of being female. This is investigative journalism. She says she is a woman with a vagina and that is also false. This our investigative input and it is more than 90% probable. There is no hard feelings in this. Sorry about that. There is a pattern in her behaviour.
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This article does not bear on any facts in the news today when it could relate to a fact scenario probably involving other persons and other Donalds. We cannot be sure due to the sketchy details as Donald(from Colorado) was apparently flying to Mirror Larger that day; any day. She cannot allege a date now. There is no date. She made a serious allegation that has no date. Its a vagary. He was with his family and what day was it that this allegedly transpired? She does not know and will not say what day this unbelievable, horrendous event happened over two years. The allegation does not say when. This is a problem if its a court allegation. What do you want me to do with it crazy bitch?
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Here are some Wikipedia notes that could be helpful and relevant about other and similar situations in the news today.
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See Warren tap dance in the Court to Lawrence Welk. He sure does stay in time to the music.
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Sexual assault allegations[edit]
Les Moonves[edit]
Carroll was one of 13 women who accused CBS Corporation executive Les Moonves of sexual assault in 2019. She says the incident occurred in the late 1990s in a hotel elevator after interviewing Moonves for a story; he denied the allegation.[3]
Donald Trump[edit]
On June 21, 2019, Carroll published an article in New York magazine which stated that Donald Trump had sexually assaulted her in late 1995 or early 1996, when she was already in her fifties, in the Bergdorf Goodman department store in New York City. Further details of the alleged incident were published in her book What Do We Need Men For?: A Modest Proposal.[3][11][44] Carroll said that on her way out of the store she ran into Trump and he asked for help buying a gift for a woman. After suggesting a handbag or a hat, the two reputedly moved on to the lingerie section and joked about the other trying some on. Carroll said they ended up in a dressing room together, the door of which was shut, and Trump forcefully kissed her, pulled down her tights and raped her before she was able to escape. She stated that the alleged incident lasted less than three minutes.[45][46] Lisa Birnbach and Carol Martin told New York magazine that Carroll had confided with them shortly after the alleged assault.[11][3][47]
Trump denied the allegations and claimed that he had never met Carroll.[45] However, Carroll provided New York a photograph of her socializing with Trump in 1987.[11][48] Trump dismissed the photograph's significance.[45]
Carroll initially chose not to describe the alleged sexual assault as rape, instead describing it as a fight. "My word is fight. My word is not the victim word ... I fought."[49][50][51]
Defamation lawsuit[edit]
In November 2019, Carroll filed a defamation lawsuit with the New York Supreme Court. The suit states that Trump had damaged her reputation, substantially harmed her professionally, and caused emotional pain. Carroll stated "Decades ago, the now President of the United States raped me. When I had the courage to speak out about the attack, he defamed my character, accused me of lying for personal gain, even insulted my appearance." She stated that she was "filing this (lawsuit) on behalf of every woman who has ever been harassed, assaulted, silenced, or spoken up only to be shamed, fired, ridiculed and belittled." White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham described the suit as "frivolous" and claimed Carroll's story was fraudulent.[52]
In September 2020, government lawyers from the Department of Justice (DOJ) asserted that Trump had acted in his official capacity while responding to Carroll's accusation; they asserted that the Federal Tort Claims Act[a] grants their department the right to take the case from Trump's private lawyers and move it to federal court.[53] This would end the lawsuit, as the government cannot be sued for defamation.[54] Carroll's lawyer, Roberta A. Kaplan, stated that "Trump's effort to wield the power of the U.S. government to evade responsibility for his private misconduct is without precedent."[53] In October 2020, U.S. District Court Judge Lewis Kaplan (not related) rejected the DOJ's motion, arguing that the president is not a government employee and that Trump's comments were not related to his job as such.[55] The following month, the DOJ filed an appeal with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.[55]
In June 2021 (during the Biden administration), the DOJ argued to the Second Circuit appeals court that DOJ lawyers should defend Trump as a federal employee.[56] On September 27, 2022, the appeals court ruled that "we cannot say what the District would do" in terms of allowing Trump to be shielded by his former office as U.S. president.[57] On October 19, Trump was deposed as a witness in the case.[54] In January 2023, the District of Columbia (D.C.) appeals court held oral arguments before a full panel of judges.[58] Trump's lawyers argued that his comments fell within the scope of his employment, while some judges pointed out that D.C. law holds employers responsible when their employees cause individuals harm in the scope of their employment but not otherwise.[59][60]
On November 24, 2022, Carroll sued Trump for battery in New York under the Adult Survivors Act, a law passed the previous May which briefly allows sexual assault victims to file civil suits regardless of expired statutes of limitations.[61] Carroll made a renewed claim of defamation, citing statements Trump made in October.[62][63] In February 2023, Kaplan scheduled the trial date for April 25.[64] The New York Daily News reported that Trump and Carroll were expected to be called as witnesses.[46]
On April 13, 2023, Carroll disclosed that part of her legal expenses were funded by Reid Hoffman, a private equity investor and donor to the Democratic Party.[65]
On the other hand, i.t has, beep held . that, a .man may be guilty of perjury if he, swears to a particular, fact without, at the time, knowing whether it be true or false. It.is no defense that the oath so taken is true, if the party swears, to it willfully and corruptly, and has no probable ground for the oath. 1 Hawkins P. C., C. 27, page 433; People vs. McKenney, 3 Parker C. R. 510.
. It will thus be seen that there is a, difference, between a willful false .oath, constituting the crime of, perjury, and a false oath which, at common law, might he punished as a misdemeanor. The one is stubborn and, corrupt, while the other is simply not true, lacking the elements which go to .constitute the crime of perjury as defined by our statute. The jury must find that the accused was guilty of taking a willfully false oath, and in relation to matter material to the issue, in order to convict him of the crime of perjury and to render him liable to the .punishment prescribed for that .offense, and to,this end the court should have so charged .them.
Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 577 (1876)
1. The act of 1870, entitled “ An act concerning testimony,” gives to the accused in all criminal prosecutions the right to make a statement, under oath, before the jury, of the matter of his or her defense, and does not make the accused a witness in the case, or subject him to the rules governing in the examination of witnesses.
3. Such statement, when so made, is for the jury alone, and to be taken by them into consideration in connection with all the evidence of the case, and to be allowed such weight, and such only, as they, in their judgment, may see fit to give to it. •
3. It is not sufficient, in a case of perjury, for the court to charge the jury “ that if they believed, from the testimony, that the accused took the oath, and that it was false, he was guilty.” The court should charge that they must find that the accused took a wilfully false oath, and that it must be so taken in relation to matter material (o the issue, in order to make him subject to the punishment provided for perjury.
Writ of error from tbe Circuit Court of Madison county.
JE. J. Vann for Appellant.
I. Tbe court below erred in refusing to grant to tbe accused “ tbe right of making a statement of tbe matter of his defense, under oath, before tbe jury,” unless be was put upon tbe stand as a witness, subject to be cross-examined, &c., as a witness. Laws of Fla. 1866, Chap. 1473, No. 10, Sec. 4.
Intention of the law-maker may be gathered from tbe context. In tbe first three sections of said act, parties to civil actions who are allowed to testify are mentioned.and described as witnesses. This qualification is not used in section 4, and tbe idea conveyed by it is, by a proper construction of said section, they are excluded.
.This view is not in conflict with 13 Fla. 680 — Barber vs. State.
Tbe discretion given to tbe court below to permit tbe party accused to make said “ statement ” was repealed by *578act in 1870, and the “ right ” to make it guaranteed without qualification. Laws 1870, Chap. 1816, No. 2.
The reason and policy of the law forbids:
1. Because the accused could not be made amenable as a witness — for instance, for contempt for not answering, &c., impracticable, &c.
2. Because by an expert cross-examination the accused might be entrapped into a confession, the fear of which, or ' a refusal to answer, might render this “ right ” a practical nullity.
3. Because intended as an ex pmte “ statement ” of such ás, and as much as, he may wish to “ state ” as “ the matter of his defense.”
I. Because no detriment to the State can result, as it is the exclusive right and province of the jury to believe the “ statement ” in whole, or in part, or not, as they may see proper.
II. The court .erred in refusing, after the accused was sworn as a witness, under the ruling of the court, to allow him to testify to the matter or facts as made known, offered and px*oposed (in substance) to the court.
Because said testimony or “ statement ” was relevant, pertinent and propex’, in that it showed, or intended to show, the intent, to-wit: that the oath alleged to be false was xxot willfully, knowingly and cox’rxxptly false, the intent being the gist of the offense, and as the “ prisoner must be judged as though the facts wex-e as honestly believed to be true.” 1 Bish. Cr. Law, §§ 287, 288; 2 Ib. 1006-7-8; 2 Bish. Cr. Pro. §§ 811 to 850.
As to ignorance of law, of fact, and both of law and fact, vide 1 Bish. Cr. Law, §§ 291 to 312, 320 and 315.
III. The court ex'red in charging the jux-y that if they be- _ lieved from the evidence that the accused took the oath, and that it was false, the prisoner “ is guilty.” Because the court should have charged that, if they believed from the evidence that the accused took the oath, and that it was *579Jmowingly, willfully and corruptly false, they might find him guilty. 2 Bish. Cr. Law, 1006-7-8; 2 Bish. Cr. Pro. 841 to 880; Statute in regard to and definition of perjury, Bush. Dig. p. — ; 3 McLean, 583; 4 Ib. 113; 3 Ala. 602; and supra as to intent.
IV. The court erred in charging the jury that they should not consider anything the prisoner said. 13 Fla. 680.
V. The court erred in charging the jury that ignorance was no excuse, and that if the accused wished to avail himself of such a defense, he should have plead “ insanity or idiocy,” and that they could not consider it without commit, ting perjury. 1 Bish. Cr. Law, 394 to 412.
VI. The court erred in charging the jury as follows: “You have nothing to do with the excuse-on account of ignorance — that is a matter for the court — he should have ■plead it, &c. Authorities cited supra.
VII. The court erred in charging the jury that the accused “ understood what the court asked him — was he any relation .to Jerry Grimes.” The court cannot express an opinion as to the conclusiveness, or vice versa, of the testimony — that is for the jury alone. Fla. Reports and Laws, passim. '
VIII. The court erred in refusing to grant the accused a new trial. Vide charge of the court; exceptions taken at tqial; motion for a new trial; and authorities cited above.
Mr. Attorney-General W. A. Oocke for the State.
1. Moved to strike from the docket, because the writ of error and supersedeas were obtained after the criminal was confined in the penitentiary. The writ of error and supersedeas could not reach the warden of the penitentiary—
1. ' Because not addressed to him.
2. . Because the bonds could not be given on which the writ of error and supersedeas were granted. Vide act of Legislature in relation to writs of error and supersedeas. Bush, LVII. p. 278; Bouv. title, error; writ of error ad*580dressed to the court. See Bouv. title, supersedeas. Wharton’s Criminal Law, 3049.
Bill of Exceptions.
Grounds taken on the bill of exceptions, insufficient.
1. That the accused should be placed on the stand as a witness. If he made his statement, why should he not be cross-examined ? The law does not forbid it. See statute, Jan. 16, 1866.
2. The second exception — no grounds for setting aside the verdict of the jury.
Perjury is defined by our statute; this is a statutory offense, not one at common law. See Perjury at Common Law; Wharton’s American Criminal Law, Vol. 3, §§ 2198 and 2,199.
There is a difference in the statutory offense of perjury. Vide act of 1868, Laws of Florida, Chap. 6, p. 89, Sec. 2.
It is not, as contended in the bill of exceptions, necessary that the court should have instructed the jury that the oath was “ knowingly, wilfully and corruptly false.” That was not even required by the common law.
The indictment charges the accused with “ wilfully ’’.committing perjury. This is the only term used in the statute. This is sufficient evidence in the English and American practice. See Bouv. Law Dic. title, perjury, and the large number of cases cited.
The third ground of exception is, that the accused was ignorant that he was committing perjwry. This is no excuse. Vide Wharton’s American Criminal Law, 6 Ed. § 2,201, and eases cited on same page, notes k. n. o.
The court had the right to refuse to permit the statement to go to the jury after it was made. The discretionary power had not departed from the court to refuse the statement of the witness even after it had been made. Vide Barber vs. the State of Florida, XIII Fla., Opinion of the Court, p. 680, citing the act of January 16, 1866, (not of 1865, as mentioned in the opinion.)
*581The law in Bush is incorrectly copied; a part is left out.
It is also a mistake of Mr. Bush in stating that the act is repealed. Act of January 16, 1866.
Statement of the Case.
On November 24, 1875, John Miller, the plaintiff in error, was duly arraigned and- tried in the Circuit Court of the 3d Judicial District, held in and for Madison county, on an indictment for perjury.
The indictment charged that on the 20th day of October, .1874, at a Circuit Court held at the court-house in the county of Madison, one Jerry Grimes was being tried upon an indictment for feloniously procuring a felony to be committed by one Isaiah Phillips, charged with the crime of forgery. That this John Miller was called and appeared as a juror ; that he was challenged and sworn by the Judge touching his qualifications as such juror. That it became a material question and subject of inquiry whether the. said John Miller was related to the accused, Jerry Grimes. That the said John Miller, intending to deceive the said court, unlawfully, falsely, knowingly, willfully and corruptly, did swear that he was not related to the said Jerry Grimes, when, in fact, at that' time, he was the father-in-law of the said Jerry Grimes. That he so swore for the purpose of causing the said Jerry Grimes to be wrongfully acquitted on the said indictment, and for no other purpose whatever. That said John Miller knowingly, willfully and corruptly did commit willful and corrupt perjury.
On the trial of the cause, the counsel for the accused took certain exceptions to the rulings of the court, which, having been duly settled and signed by the Circuit Judge, appear in the return to the writ of error in the following words;
I. On the trial of the case, after the State had rested the defendant, the party accused, claimed and insisted' upon the1 right of making, a statement to the jury, under oath, of the matter of his defénse. Whereupon, the court refused to *582allow Kim to do so, unless Ke was put up as a witness, subject to cross-examination.
To which ruling of the court the said accused excepted.
II. The court, among,other things, charged the jury that if they believed from the testimony that the accused took the oath, and that it was false, the accused was guilty.
To which the accused excepted on the ground that the court should have charged that, if the accused- took the oath, and it was knowingly, willfully and. corruptly false, they might find a verdict of guilty.
III. The accused offered to make a statement of the matter, of his defense, on oath,;before the jury, which defense was (in substance) as, stated,to the court: “That it was true that Jerry Grimes married the daughter of the accused, but that soon after their marriage said Grimes ill-treated his daughter and abandoned her. That he had for several years been compelled to . support his (laughter and child. That Jerry Grimes had gone off, and he, did hot consider he was anything to him or his family. That when the accused was asked oh his vtivr dwe whether or not he was related to the prisoner "at the bar, Jerry Grimes, he answered he was not, being1 át the time of the taking the said, oath under the iona fide impression and conviction that, as lie, the said Jerry Grimes, had left his'.wife, &c., as aforesaid; he really was not related to, the accused, Jerry Grimes. That he made oath to what he ignorantly supposed to be time, and thus that lie did'not willfully- and corruptly make said oath.”
The court’'refused' to allow the accused to make such a defense;1 either as a statement'or otherwise, on the ground, as the court-Said, of its irrelevancy, and that if the same vr'as trtíé it-would bé no défénse, as ignorance of law was no excuse. " '" "’ ......, “ ,
To ;tv'hi6h the accused excepted.
TKé’jury11 found' the, prisoner' guilty, of perjury. The ■ counsel for “the "accused moved for a new trial upon the érrdís So 'alleged, and also upon the further grounds that the *583verdict of the jury was contrary to law, and because the jury was mislead by the charge of the court.
The motion for new trial was denied, and the court proceeded to senténce the prisoner to State prison for the term of ten years. '
The accused' brings the cause into this court by writ of error.
delivered the opinion of the court.
On the trial of this case, and after the State had rested, the counsel for the, accused offered the statement of the prisoner, under oath, as to the matter of his defense, which the court refused to allow, unless he was put upon the stand as a witness, subject to cross-examination.
The statute of 1865, Chapter 1172; Section é, provides that “ in all criminal prosecutions, the party accused shall have the right of making a statement of the matters of his or her defense, under oath, before the jury, when, in the opinion of the court, the ends of justice shall so require.”
Under this act, it was in the discretion of the court to permit the accused to make such a statement, depending entirely upon the question ás to whether the “ ends of justice shall, so require.”
' The making of such a statement under oath does not necessarily constitute the accused a witness, nor does it subject him to the rules applicable to witnesses, making him liable to cross-examination. (It is simply a presentation verbally, in his own language and manner, of the'matters .pertaining to his defense, of such facts and circumstances surrounding the ease as will go to excuse the offense and negative the idea of willful or corrupt intent. It is for the jury alone, and is to be taken into consideration by them, in connection' with all of the evidence in the case, and to be allowed such weight, and such only, as they, in their judgment, may see fit to give it.
*584In the case of Barber vs. the. State, (13 Fla. 681,).Where-the error alleged was, that “ the court charged the; jury that ;the statement, of. the .defendant is mot. evidence, and. that they could not take such statement into consideration':as;evidencé,”’the court says : “There was spine purpose,..to be Subserved more, than, the mere amusement,Of the jury. in; allowing the statement to be made. It is the jury, alone, who • are entitled to: consider the statement, and if it.be remarked upon at .ally it should.-be to suggest, to. the- jury, in effect, that they are-to. attach to it such importance,’■ in. view' of the nature'of the offense charged, and'of the: testimony, before •them, as in their good judgment it is , entitled to-., It is for .their consideration alono,, and they may disregard it entirely.” And, again ; “ The defendant is entitled,'when.-permitted t.o make the statement; to the benefit or disadvantage of 'such -impression' as' he- may be able to.make'upon the judgment of the jury.” ' 'v.ii ■■ ■
This .statute, however, of 1865, was repealed by Chapter 1816 of the laws of 1870. This is., an act-entitled •“ An act ■concerning’testimony,” embodied in a. -single- section, and ■reads.as follows : “ In the courtsmf -Florida,-there shall be no exclusion of any witness in.á civil action because he is a party to or interested ¡in the, issue tried'. In- all the criminal prosecutions,, the-party accused shall.; have the right of making a statement to the.jury, under oath, of the matter of his or .her defense.”-r- i’¡ A fi ¡-'Aw; b f.-
This takes from, the court the discretion .-allowed by the statute of -1865, and the unqualified right of-the: accused to ¡make' such a statement, under - oath,. to. th.er-ju-ry; is. .established, -, by- law. - : -. ■; •;. wh -: AV -
■ - Had it been the intention of the Legislature -to provide that the accused should make himself a,witness,,subject :to ;the rules, controlling in the examination of . witnesses,■¡there would have been no necessity, for the second • paragraph in the section where, this - provision is found;, A slight change of the-first portion of the-section woulddi'ave,. covered every case of civil action or criminal prosecution.
*585n.c.llhb.-iedofld’igibhn&tbf'erro'r is : ■' “ The court, artiong Other things, bharged-dhe- jury that’ if:, they ■bélíevedy'fro'm the testimony, "that -the accused -took the oath,-'and-that if ■wa§'''fa.lsé;~theácbiísed'tvás:gtúlty':-,: ? • ■< ' hr s v;v *
Perjui-y-is defined - in' the elementary"-books tó -be-the-taking Of a¿-Willfully- false oath by One1 who, being lawfully -sWórn !'by a’ Competent’ court to depose the'-truth in'arty judicial- proceeding,, swears absolutely-: and- falsely, irt ’ a matter ihateriul to the point' im-questiori, Whether he be believed. Or -hot. Orir statute pin accordance1 Witfr’thie definition Of péyjüry, in an “ act to provide for the punishment of crimé-artd ' proceedings;in- criminal cases,”’ passed in-1868,hays “Whoever; beinga^lthor3zed■or■u'cqui-red'.by,law to’-take'-an oath»or affirmation,'willfully swears or affirms, falsely,' in regard:-to 'any onateriál'orvatteror'Úimg respéetirig wdiieh such Oatli or affirmation is- authorized' or required,cshall be deemed guilty of perjury,” &c. \ m’ i, ''W.
"It will-be seen that both at eoinmon dawand by'statute in--this State,'the rule is the same, "or,: in'.-Other-words; that'the 'eOmmob'law definition of tlie crime -qfpei'juryis made a portion of the statutes, and that the okth must'-not-'only-bo false, but'that'it-must be^ii^Ziyiail'segan'd-to’ matter’’ material to the -issu'C. It- is. neees’sary so ■ to charge :the'- offense in thedndictme’rtt;!oí1 tlierbis'---no:-’criine'alleged.1"''An-oath ' may be false', -and still'not willfully false, so ns- tó - constitute the crime of perjury. 2 Bishop Crim. Law, §1046. See, also, Commonwealth vs. Brady, 5 Gray, 78.
- It may also be to an immaterial matter; out King,- one;'not material to the'issue,'- in which'case,-it COuld'diot hedield as a willful false oath. 1 Hawkins P. C., C. 27, page 431.
- In Some cases,'where a¡ false oath has" been- ¡tákény :the. 'party was •purt'ished'hy'-irtdiC,tmbnt!,a-i.!cornihoh;iiaw;'for bmiádemeanói', though the offerise’did not amoünt to-'perjury.:,‘'i 2 Russell on Crimes, 603; 2 Bishop C.L., § 1014.
flt-'is said1 “the false Oath ffifist'berwdlífukartd taken1 with some degree: of deliberation"; 'for if, lipón th'é -Wholebircnm*586stances, o.f the. ease,, it shall appear probable .that, it was* owing rather to the weakness than perverseness of the party, •as where it was occasioned by surprise, or inadvertency, or •a mistake of the true state of the question, it cannot but be hard to make it amount to voluntary and corrupt perjury, ' which is of all crimes whatsoever the. most infamous and ,detestable.” 1 Hawkins, P. C., C, 27, § 2; 2 Russell on Crimes, 597.
A false oath, taken by inadvertence,,01: mistake, cannot ^amount to voluntary and corrupt, perjury. 2 Wharton C. L. § 2199.
On the other hand, i.t has, beep held . that, a .man may be guilty of perjury if he, swears to a particular, fact without, at the time, knowing whether it be true or false. It.is no defense that the oath so taken is true, if the party swears, to it willfully and corruptly, and rhas.po probable ground for the oath. 1 Hawkins P. C., C. 27, page 433; People vs. McKenney, 3 Parker C. R. 510.
. It will thus be seen that there is a, difference, between a willful false .oath, constituting the crime of, perjury, and a false oath which, at common law, might he punished as a misdemeanor. The one is stubborn and, corrupt, while the other is simply not true, lacking the elements which go to .constitute the crime of perjury as defined by our statute. The jury must find that the accused was guilty of taking a willfully false oath, and in relation to matter material to the issue, in order to convict him of the crime of perjury and to render him liable to the .punishment prescribed for that .offense, and to,this end the court should have so charged .them.
The third ground of error assigned*' is similar to and em■braeed in the first,' that the couft refused to permit the accused. to, make his statement pf the matters,, of his ' defense, 'on oath, before the jury. The accused, at the same time of ■making such offer, stated' tó the court‘the sxxbstance of the statement so proposed to be inada The coxxi't refused to *587grant the request upon the ground of irrelevancy, and said that if the facts so proposed to be stated to the jury were true, it was no ■ defense. This point has been disposed of under the first above assignment of error, where we hold that the accused, under the statute, has a- right to make a statement of the matter of his defense, on oath, before the jury. We cannot see how such a statement as is offered by the accused would be irrelevant. It related, certainly, to the matter of his defense; to the question, which the jury must determine, of the intent. Was the oath alleged to have been taken by the accused willfully false ? or was it taken through inadvertence, and not with a corrupt motive ? It would go for what' it was worth, and while it might hot strictly be a defense to the prosecution,- yet the accused had á right to its consideration by the jury, whose judgment might have been influenced in his favor by it. “ It - would give to the jury for their consideration the facts upon which his oath was based, and the reasons operating upon his mind, and, from those facts and reasons they might determine the motives, if any, influencing him. We think it should have been admitted by the court.
The judgment must be reversed and a new trial awarded.
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